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Constitutional-Criminal Law-Miranda Revisited: Broadening the Right
to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation-Commonwealth v. Sher
man, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983)
The judicially created Miranda protections require law enforcement
officials to inform criminal suspects of their right to counsel prior
to proceeding with custodial interrogation. I In Commonwealth v.
Sherman,l the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered
whether a criminal defendant validly waived his right to counsel when
a police officer failed to inform him that an attorney, appointed to
represent him in an unrelated case, had requested to be present dur
ing his interrogation. 3 Concluding that, under the peculiar cir
cumstances of the case, the defendant did not voluntarily waive his
right to counsel, the court suppressed the defendant's in-custody
statements to police. 4
After receiving a tip regarding several recent house burglaries, Leon
Manning, a state police officer, encountered Everett L. Sherman on
a public street, and ordered him to come to the police station. s At
the station, Manning informed Sherman that he was suspected of com
mitting the burglaries, and gave the defendant his Miranda rights.6
1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444,467-73 (1966) (police must inform criminal
defendants of right to have attorney present during questioning). The Miranda Court developed
protections for the criminal suspect to effectuate the fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination. Id. at 444,469-70; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (criminal defendant not compelled
to testify against self). The traditional protections of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 463-64, 467; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 6 (1964).
The Miranda Court defined custody as any significant deprivation of a suspect's freedom
of action. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is in force, and the right to counsel attaches, only when police interrogate
a suspect while in custody. Id. at 467-73; cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980)
(discussion between two police officers prompting suspect to lead police to murder weapon
not custodial interrogation). See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda:
What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. I, 63-64 (1978) (examining
meaning and interpretation of interrogation in Supreme Court decisions).
2. 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983).
3. Id. at 289-91, 450 N.E.2d at 567-68.
4. Id. at 287, 295-96, 450 N .E.2d at 570-71 (1983). In addition to suppressing the defen
dant's inculpatory statements, the Sherman court remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at
296, 450 N.E.2d at 571. The court, however, did not find sufficient grounds to dismiss all
of the charges against the defendant. Id. at 295, 450 N.E.2d at 570.
5. Id. at 288-89, 450 N.E.2d at 567. Manning had received an anonymous tip that Foster
Jones, Sherman'S eventual co-defendant, had committed recent house burglaries. Id. Another
police officer informed Manning that Sherman and Jones "hung around" together. Brief and
Appendix for Appellant at 3, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566
(1983). Manning learned of Sherman's possible involvement solely from this conversation. Id.
6. [d. at 289, 450 N.E.2d at 567. An interrogating officer noted that the suspect would
be "easier to interview" without his attorney present. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at
3, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 289, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983).

100

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XVIII:99

Earlier the same morning, Manning, while in court on a different
matter, initiated conversation with Attorney Rita Scales because he
knew that she had been, or was presently, representing Sherman. 7
Manning informed Scales of his intention to question Sherman with
regard to the burglaries and, although Scales requested that Manning
inform her prior to any interrogation, he did not respond. 8
Manning did not contact Scales when he brought Sherman to the
station, and failed to inform Sherman of Scale's request to be pre
sent during questioning. 9 After indicating that he understood his
Miranda rights and waiving his right to counsel, Sherman made in
criminating statements in response to Manning's inquiries. lo Prior to
trial, Sherman moved to suppress these statements, but the judge denied
the motion, noting that Sherman had understood his Miranda rights
and made an intelligent waiver of counsel. II A jury found Sherman
guilty on two counts of breaking and entering. 12 The Massachusetts
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Sherman volun
tarily and intelligently waived his rights. 13 The Supreme Judicial Court,
7. 389 Mass. at 289, 450 N .E.2d at 567. Ms. Scales, a court appointed attorney with the
Massachusetts Defenders Committee, had been appointed to represent Sherman in another break
ing and entering case. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. After Sherman implicated himself in the burglaries, Manning transcribed the statements
and Sherman signed them. Id.
II. 389 Mass. at 288 n.l, 450 N.E.2d at 567 n.1. Attempting to suppress incriminating
statements prior to trial, Sherman argued violations of his fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment
rights. Id. The defense also argued prosecutorial misconduct required dismissal of the com
plaints. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 15, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287,
450 N.E.2d 566 (1983). The motion judge determined that Manning's actions reasonably led
the defendant to believe that the police were subjecting him to custodial interrogation, and
that, under the circumstances, the defendant's freedom was "limited and restricted." Brief
and Appendix for Appellant at 6, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d
566 (1983).
In ascertaining the scope of Scales' representation of the defendant, the motion judge con
cluded that because a Massachusetts Defenders Attorney does not accept cases until appointed
at the arraignment, Scales was not actually representing Sherman at the time of the interroga
tion. 389 Mass. at 289-90, 450 N.E.2d at 567. Giving great weight to the fact that the defen
dant signed the incriminating statements three separate times, the motion judge held that Sher
man made a valid and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. See Brief and Appendix for
Appellant at R.17-18, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983).
12. 389 Mass. at 287-88, 450 N.E.2d at 566.
13. Commonwealth v. Sherman, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 971, 971,438 N.E.2d 1098, 1098 (1982).
In affirming the motion judge, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals applied standards set forth
in Commonwealth v. Andjur. Id. The Andjur court recognized that there is no absolute con
stitutional mandate for an attorney to be present during, or notified prior to, an interrogation.
Commonwealth v. Andjur, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 777,783,390 N.E.2d 276, 280 (1979). In evaluating
Commonwealth v. Sherman, the Supreme Judicial Court specificially rejected the applicability
of Andjur. 389 Mass. at 290, 450 N.E.2d at 568.
Although the appeals court also dismissed Sherman's claim of prosecutorial misconduct,
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however, determined that Manning's failure to inform Sherman of
Scales' request precluded a valid, intelligent waiver of his Miranda
rights. 14 The court, therefore, suppressed Sherman's statements and
granted him a new trial. I 5
In Miranda v. Arizona,16 the United States Supreme Court held
that officials must warn criminal suspects of their constitutional rights
to remain silent and obtain legal assistance prior to commencing
custodial interrogation. I' After Miranda, incriminating statements ob
tained from defendants during custodial interrogation were inadmissible
if the police had not advised a defendant of her or his rights. 18 A
later Supreme Court case built upon Miranda to establish that once
a suspect opts to exercise her or his right to counsel, further inter
rogation is prohibited until counsel is provided, unless the suspect
initiates the conversation. 19
Although the Miranda Court acknowledged that a defendant could
conceivably waive her or his right to counsel during custody, a defen
dant's silence alone will not give rise to a presumption of waiver. 20
the court admitted that "it would have been better for all concerned" if the police had informed
Sherman of his attorney's request. Commonwealth v. Sherman, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 971, 973,
438 N.E.2d 1098, 1099 (1982).
14. 389 Mass. at 288, 450 N.E.2d at 566; see infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text
(discussing rationale of Sherman court).
15. 389 Mass. at 296, 450 N.E.2d at 571.
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. Id. at 479. The Miranda warnings were adopted to alleviate the coercive and intimidating
overtones of custodial interrogation. Id. at 457. The Miranda Court balanced the need for
custodial interrogation as a valid tool of police investigation against the importance of protect
ing individual rights, concluding that limits on interrogation procedures should not unduly in
fringe upon a proper law enforcement system. Id. at 479-91.
18. Id. at 478-79. The Miranda Court realized that in order for the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to be effective, the defendant needed protections to counterbalance
the inherent coercive and compUlsive nature of police interrogations. Id. at 445-58, 467-73.
The Court construed the right to counsel as a mechanism to protect the defendant's fifth amend
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 467-78. Miranda established a presumption that
custodial interrogation creates an inherently coercive atmosphere of police domination. Id. at
445-58.
Miranda created additional tension between law enforcement procedures and individual fifth
amendment rights. See S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1968, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2123, 2127 (Miranda results in release of guilty criminals and
demoralization of law enforcement officials). But see Elsen and Rosett, Protections of the Suspect
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 645, 656 (1967) (Miranda warnings may induce
cooperation from suspect).
19. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1981); see ALI MODEL CoDE OF PRE
AIlRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8 (1975) (promulgating Edwards approach). See generally Note,
Reinforcing Miranda-Restricting Interrogation After A Request for Counsel, 48 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 593, 600-02 (1982) (discussing importance of defendant invoking right to counsel during
custodial interrogation in determining validity of waiver).
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,475-76 (1966). In a prior case, the Court defined
a valid waiver as "an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v.
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Miranda established that when a defendant waives her or his right
to counsel, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted know
ingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 21 The Supreme Court, however,
has never clearly articulated waiver of counsel standards. 22
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that a defen
dant cannot validly, intelligently, and knowingly waive her or his right
to counsel after an attorney has contacted police on the defendant's
behalf, unless police inform the defendant of the attorney's offer of
assistance prior to the waiver. 23 In Commonwealth v. McKenna,24 the
Supreme Judicial Court suppressed statements made by the defen
dant during custodial interrogation after an attorney had contacted
the police and requested to counsel the defendant during questioning. 2s
Zerbst, 304 u.s. 458, 464 (1938). The specific circumstances of each case will determine the
validity of a waiver. Id.; see Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-17 (1962) (no presumption
of valid waiver derived from defendant's silence and fact that confession eventually obtained).
The Miranda Court stated that although a pre-interrogation request for an attorney secures
the defendant's rights, failure to make such a request does not constitute a waiver, because
a valid waiver cannot take place until police give a suspect Miranda warnings. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470-75 (1966).
21. Id. at 475. The Miranda Court required the prosecution to affirmatively demonstrate
the voluntariness of a defendant's waiver, rather than have courts consider voluntariness as
merely one factor in the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 467-76. To prove a valid waiver
of counsel, the prosecution must demonstrate not only that police gave Miranda warnings to
the defendant, but also that the defendant understood these rights and intentionally forfeited
them. See generally Note, North Carolina v. Butler: Waiver oj Rights During Custodial Inter
rogation, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 245, 249 (1980) (discussing background and implica
tions of Miranda and progeny). Given these stringent standards, a state must show an affir
mative act by the defendant in order to unquestionably demonstrate the validity of the waiver.
Id. Under certain circumstances, however, police may infer a valid waiver from the behavior
of a suspect during interrogation. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373-75 (1979).
22. See generally 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 247, 250 & n.26 (1980) (discussing Miranda
Court's lack of clear waiver standards and resulting confusion in lower courts). The Supreme
Court's inability to articulate a clear waiver of counsel standard led to varied judicial results.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 770 (5th Cir. 1979) (per se rule of ad
missibility if defendant invokes right to counsel, and statement elicited without presence of
attorney); United States v. Hopkins, 433 F.2d 1041, 1044 (5th Cir. 1970) (if suspect refuses
to sign waiver, interrogation must cease unless suspect voluntarily initiates conversation), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1167-69 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (although suspect signed waiver, his refusal to allow police to take written notes con
stitutes contradictory non-waiver); United States v. Nielson, 392 F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1968)
(setting strict guidelines for police behavior; heavy burden on interrogators to determine if suspect
understood rights).
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299, 305, 376 N.E.2d 866, 870 (1978)
(waiver valid when attorney volunteers services to former client and police inform defendant
of offer); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 691-92, 335 N.E.2d 660, 678 (1975) (no
valid waiver when attorney repeatedly attempted to contact defendant in police custody, at
torney never informed of interrogation, and defendant not informed of attorney's attempts);
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 319-20, 325-26, 244 N.E.2d 562-63, 566-67 (1969)
(statements suppressed when police misled defendant's attorney as to location of interrogation).
24. 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560 (1969).
25. Id. at 324-27, 244 N.E.2d at 5~8.
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Broadly construing the defendant's Miranda rights, the McKenna court
held that an attorney's actions may invoke the defendant's right to
counsel subsequent to a valid waiver by the defendant. 26
The Supreme Judicial Court similarly suppressed a defendant's in
criminating statements in Commonwealth v. Mahnke,27 where police,
cognizant of an attorney's repeated attempts to contact the defen
dant, failed to notify either the attorney of the ensuing interrogation
or the defendant of his attorney's offers of assistance. 28 Reasoning
that the police conduct was "calculated to circumvent" the defen
dant's rights, the Mahnke court held the defendant's statements in
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 29 In Massachusetts,
therefore, defendants can waive their right to counsel only after police
inform them of their Miranda rights and notify them of specific of
fers of counsel. 30
The Sherman court found that the failure of police to inform the
defendant of his attorney's request critically affected his knowledge
and, thus, his ability to make a valid and intelligent waiver of the
Miranda right to counsel. 31 The short lapse of time between Scale's
26. [d. The McKenna court held that a waiver of the right to counsel is effective olIly
when a defendant is fully cognizant of all relevant circumstances. [d. Additionally, police must
afford the defendant the opportunity to make a fresh waiver if any important circumstances
change. See generally Comment, Criminal Procedure-Admissibility of Confessions-Dancing
on the Grave of Miranda? 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1141, 1163 (1976) (discussing McKenna's
broad interpretation of Miranda).
27. 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
28. [d. at 691-92, 335 N.E.2d at 678.
29. [d. The Mahnke court, consistent with restrictive post-Miranda decisions, held the def~n
dant's statements available for impeachment only if voluntary and trustworthy. [d. at 692-93,
335 N.E.2d at 678-79; see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (promulgating im
peachment exception).
30. Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 692-95, 335 N.E.2d 660, 678-80 (1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 323-24, 244
N.E.2d 560, 565-66 (1969); see Commonwealth v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299, 305, 376 N.E.2d 866,
870 (1978) (defendant validly waived rights when police informed him of former attorney
volunteering services).
31. 389 Mass. at 289-90, 450 N.E.2d at 568. As the Sherman court observed, when a state
ment is obtained from a defendant, in the absence of counsel, a heavy burden rests on the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's waiver was knowing and
intelligent. [d., 450 N.E.2d at 567-68. The Supreme Court has not clearly defined standards
to evaluate waiver of counsel. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Court's
ambiguity regarding waiver of counsel standards).
The Sherman court recognized the unusual circumstances of the case, but nevertheless con
cluded that the fact that Scales' learned of Sherman's interrogation from the police was in
significant. 389 Mass. at 295, 450 N.E.2d at 570. The court noted that the defendant or family
members of the defendant typically notify an attorney of impending interrogation. [d.. at 293,
450 N.E.2d at 569; see Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 692, 697, 335 N.E.2d 660,
668, 681 (1975) (family-retained lawyer repeatedly called defendant at police station); Com
monwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 318, 244 N.E.2d 560, 563 (1969) (defendant told aunt
to call attorney).
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request and the interrogation of Sherman, and the testimony of Man
ning that he was aware of the attorney's representation of Sherman,
persuaded the court that Sherman did not knowingly, intelligently,
and understandingly waive his right to counsel. 32 Rejecting an argu
ment that McKenna is inapplicable because the police did not affir
matively frustrate the attorney's attempt to communicate with the
defendant, the court stressed the fact that Ms. Scales had clearly re
quested to be present at Sherman's interrogation. 33 Recognizing a
distinction between the "deliberately misleading" police conduct in
McKenna and Mahnke and cases of nonfeasance, the Sherman court,
nevertheless, reasoned that under the circumstances, the police of
ficer's failure to act vitiated the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights
as much as an affirmative act would have. 34 Carefully limiting its
holding to the unique facts of the case, the Sherman court suppressed
the defendant's incriminating statements and remanded the case for
a new trial. 3S
The Sherman court applied and expanded the McKenna and Mahnke
principles, placing an affirmative obligation upon police, beyond the

32. 389 Mass. at 294-95, 45.0 N.E.2d at 570. Only a few hours passed between Attorney
Scales' request and Officer Manning's interrogation of Sherman. Id. Additionally, only fifteen
minutes lapsed between the defendant's arrival at the police station and his incriminating
statements. See Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 5, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass.
289, 450 N.E.2d at 566 (1983).
33. 389 Mass. at 293, 450 N.E.2d at 569; see Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244,
263-64,431 N.E.2d 880, 892-93 (1982) (statements admissible where attorney first called police
station after interrogation ended and police unaware that defendant's family attempted to re
tain counsel).
The Sherman court found that it would unfairly elevate form over substance to hold that
Manning's failure to inform Sherman of Scales' request constitutionally significant only because
Scales had not yet been appointed to represent the defendant in the present case. 389 Mass.
at 295, 450 N .E.2d at 570; see supra note 11 (discussing attorney Scales' status). But see State
v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 23-24, 29-31 (R.1. 1982) (incriminating statements admissible when
police failed to inform defendant of attorney's availability from Public Defenders Office who
called on behalf of the suspect's attorney).
34. 389 Mass. at 292-96, 450 N.E.2d at 568-570.
35. Id. at 295-96, 450 N.E.2d at 570-71. The Sherman court limited its holding as follows:
an attorney must learn that police plan to interrogate her or his client, even on an unrelated
charge; the attorney must inform police of her or his desire to be present at the interrogation;
within a few hours of attorney's request, the police must interrogate the defendant in com
pliance with Miranda warnings, yet refrain from teUing the defendant of the attorney's request;
and, the defendant must actually make incriminating statements. Id
The sole dissenter, however, found the persuasive determination to be that the privileges
afforded Sherman outweighed the factor of police failing to inform Sherman of Scales' re
quest. [d. at 296-97,450 N.E.2d at 571 (Nolan, J., dissenting). The dissent was also dissatisfied
with the majority's handling of the publicly appointed attorney by status. See id.; see supra
note 33 (discussing majority treatment of attorney's status); see also State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d
22, 23-24, 29-31 (R.1. 1982) (police need not inform defendant of unappointed public defender's
offer to assist him).
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mere generalities of Miranda warnings, to communicate specific of
fers of counsel to criminal defendants. 36 Specifically, the court took
an important step by recognizing that Sherman might have chosen
to remain silent had he known that Scales wanted to be present dur
ing his interrogation. 37 Considering many of the factors that prey upon
an individual suspect's ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver
of counsel, the court broadened the scope of judicial inquiry to in
clude a subjective examination of the defendant's actual knowledge
at the time of the waiver. 38 By examining the defendant's actual level
of comprehension in making the waiver,39 the Sherman decision guides
other courts to consider subjective factors, beyond mere voluntariness,
when evaluating the validity of a waiver of counsel.
The Sherman decision, while remaining consistent with a recent
Supreme Court interpretation of Miranda rights, goes further by
simultaneously recognizing a subjective basis for determining the valid
ity of a waiver. 40 Although the Sherman court carefully limited its
holding,41 the decision's importance lies in the principles it asserts

36. See 389 Mass. at 295-96, 450 N.E .2d at 570-71 (requiring police to affirmatively contact
attorney in certain situations). Compare Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 691-92,
335 N.E.2d 660, 678 (1975) (police deliberately withheld information from defendant and at
torney) and Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 317-20, 244 N.E.2d 560, 567 (1969)
(statements suppressed where police deliberately misled defendant's attorney) with State v. Bur
bine, 45 I A.2d 22, 29-30 (R.1. 1982) (police not required to inform defendant of unappointed
public defender's offer of assistance).
37. 389 Mass. at 291, 450 N.E.2d at 568. The Sherman court made an important con
tradistinction between situations where a specific attorney actually offers assistance and an il
lusory situation where there is no identifiable attorney. [d. The court recognized that a suspect
may conceivably react differently when she or he is informed that a particular attorney offers
assistance, as opposed to a situation when police give general Miranda warnings of a right
to counsel. [d.
38. See id. at 293-96, 450 N.E.2d at 569-70 (court examines subjective knowledge of each
party involved). The Sherman Court noted that the defendant's statements are inadmissible
when police conduct is "calculated to circumvent" defendant's rights. [d. at 293, 450 N .E.2d
at 569; see Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 691-92, 335 N.E.2d 660, 678 (1975)
(statements suppressed when attorney repeatedly tried to contact defendant in police custody,
attorney not informed of ensuing interrogation, and defendant not informed of attorney's ac
tions); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 317-20, 244 N.E.2d 560, 567 (1969) (in
criminating statements suppressed when police misinformed defendant's attorney as to location
of interrogation).
39. See 389 Mass. at 291, 450 N.E.2d at 568 (in determining validity of waiver, court ex
amines defendant's lack of knowledge).
40. [d. at 295-96, 450 N.E.2d at 570. Although certain minimum guidelines are mandated
for a valid waiver, the Sherman court goes further by considering the factual and subjective
circumstances of each particular case. [d.; see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)
(courts may not infer waiver of right to counsel when accused responds to police initiated
questioning).
41. 389 Mass. at 295-96,450 N.E.2d at 570-71; see supra note 35 (describing limited holding
in Sherman). Although the Sherman court clearly limits the circumstances where incriminating
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and upholds. By requiring police to affirmatively act, the Sherman
court motivates police and attorneys to realize their responsibility for
upholding a suspect's constitutional rights in both substance and
form.42 Although other courts have rendered decisions effectively
diluting Miranda rights,43 the Sherman court adheres to a comparatively
broad application of Miranda rights during custodial interrogation.
Commonwealth v. Sherman strengthens procedural safeguards in
the early, but vital, stages of the criminal justice process. The Sher
man court decisively balanced the delicate relationship of attorneys,
police, and criminal suspects by supplying a standard of conduct,
beyond mere formality and procedural aquiescence, to include an ele
ment of personal responsibility. Fully realizing that criminal defen
dants facing custodial interrogation cannot meaningfully exercise their
right to counsel without knowing all salient information, the court
took precautions to protect a criminal defendant's rights. Com
monwealth v. Sherman thus succeeds in maintaining a symmetry be
tween the conflicting interests of law enforcement institutions and in
dividual rights.

Beth d. Cohen

statements should be suppressed, other courts and individual officers of the court may liberally
interprete Sherman and thus build upon the Miranda foundations.
42. See 389 Mass. at 295-96, 450 N.E.2d at 570-71 (court concerned with substance rather
than form). The court raised the level of personal responsibility by mandating that individuals
involved in the interrogation and Miranda procedure account to the court for their knowledge
and behavior. Id.
43. See United States v. Rimka, 512 F.2d 425, 426 (6th Cir. 1975) (continued interrogation
did not invalidate previous Miranda waiver); Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156, 1159-62 (Wyo.
1983) (rejecting extension of right to counsel to time arrest warrant issues). But see Commonwealth
v. Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309, 1314-15 (1979) (Pennsylvania requires explicit waiver
of Miranda rights). See generally Comment, Michigan v. Mosley: A Further Erosion oj Miranda,
13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861, 864-65 (1976) (categorizing restrictive post-Miranda cases); Com
ment, Miranda v. Arizona, The Emerging Pattern, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 409, 414-16 (1978)
(discussing erosion of strict Miranda principles).

